Il «Problema di Ackrill» e la «Tesi dei Due Corpi»: Per una critica all’interpretazione funzionalista della psicologia aristotelica

Titolo Rivista RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA
Autori/Curatori Giulia Mingucci
Anno di pubblicazione 2023 Fascicolo 2023/3
Lingua Italiano Numero pagine 17 P. 447-463 Dimensione file 179 KB
DOI 10.3280/SF2023-003007
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più clicca qui

Qui sotto puoi vedere in anteprima la prima pagina di questo articolo.

Se questo articolo ti interessa, lo puoi acquistare (e scaricare in formato pdf) seguendo le facili indicazioni per acquistare il download credit. Acquista Download Credits per scaricare questo Articolo in formato PDF

Anteprima articolo

FrancoAngeli è membro della Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA)associazione indipendente e non profit per facilitare (attraverso i servizi tecnologici implementati da CrossRef.org) l’accesso degli studiosi ai contenuti digitali nelle pubblicazioni professionali e scientifiche

The «two-­body thesis» originated as a response to «Ackrill’s Problem» regarding the inapplicability of hylomor-­ phic analysis to the soul-­body relationship but is, in effect, the ultimate defense of the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle’s psychological theory. The article examines the relationship between the supposed «two bodies» and between these and the soul in order to demonstrate that in the case of living beings, it is impossible to establish a contingent relationship between form and matter, not even at the basic level of elements or homeomerous parts. The proposal to identify the «prime matter» of living beings in a particular homeomerous body, i.e. the product of conception in the first month of gestation, will eventually be seen as a possible response to Ackrill’s Problem, showing that the first product of conception is matter not yet alive but naturally and essentially brought to life.

Parole chiave:hylomorphism, functionalism, body, soul, generation, prime matter.

  1. -­ Ackrill 1972-­1973/1979: John L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Definitions of Psuchê (1972-­ 1973), in Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle 4: Psychology and Aesthetics, Duckworth, London, 1979, pp. 65-­75.
  2. -­ Alex.Aphr. Mixt.: Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Scripta minora reliqua: Quaestiones, De fato, De mixtione, Edidit I. Bruns, CAG, supp. II 2, Reimer, Berlin, 1892.
  3. -­ Berti 1998: Enrico Berti, Aristotele e il «Mind-­Body Problem», «Iride», 11 (1998) 23, pp. 43-­62.
  4. -­ Block 1978a/1980: Ned J. Block, What is Functionalism? (1978), in Id. (ed.), Read-­ ings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Methuen, London, 1980, pp. 171-­184.
  5. -­ Block 1978b/1980: Ned J. Block, Troubles with Functionalism (1978), in Id. (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Methuen, London, 1980, pp. 268-­305.
  6. -­ Block/Fodor 1972/1980: Ned J. Block and Jerry A. Fodor, What Psychological States are Not (1972), in Ned J. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Methuen, London, 1980, pp. 237-­250.
  7. -­ Bonitz 1870: Hermann Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Reimer, Berlin, 1870.
  8. -­ Burnyeat 1992/1995: Myles F. Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft), in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima (1992), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 19952, pp. 15-­26.
  9. -­ Carraro 2017: Nicola Carraro, Aristotle’s Embryology and Ackrill’s Problem, «Phronesis», 62 (2017), pp. 274-­304.
  10. -­ Charles 2008: David Charles, Aristotle’s Psychological Theory, «Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy», 24 (2008), pp. 1-­29.
  11. -­ Charlton 1970: William Charlton (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics I-­II, Clarendon Press, Ox-­ ford, 1970.
  12. -­ Code 1976: Alan Code, The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter, «Philosophical Studies», 29 (1976), pp. 356-­367.
  13. -­ Code 1991: Alan Code, Aristotle, Searle, and the Mind-­Body Problem, in Ernest Lep-­ ore and Robert van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pp. 105-­113.
  14. -­ Code/Moravcsik 1992/1995: Alan Code and Julius M.E. Moravcsik, Explaining Var-­ ious Forms of Living, in Matha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima (1992), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 19952, pp. 129-­145.
  15. -­ Cohen 1987: S. Marc Cohen, The Credibility of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mind, in Mohan Matthen (ed.), Aristotle Today: Essays on Aristotle’s Ideal of Science, Acade-­ mic Print, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 1987, pp. 103-­125.
  16. -­ Cohen 1992/1995: S. Marc Cohen, Hylomorphism and Functionalism, in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (1992), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 19952, pp. 57-­74.
  17. -­ Cohen 1996: S. Marc Cohen, Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
  18. -­ Connell 2016: Sophia Connell, Aristotle on Female Animals: A Study of the Generation of Animals, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016.
  19. -­ Dennett 1969: Daniel Dennett, Content and Consciousness, London, 1969.
  20. -­ De Ribera-­Martin 2019: Ignacio De Ribera-­Martín, Seed (Sperma) and Kuêma in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals, «Journal of the History of Biology», 52 (2019) 1, pp. 87-­124.
  21. -­ Fodor 1968: Jerry A. Fodor, Psychological Explanations, Random House, New York, 1968.
  22. -­ Fodor 1974/1980: Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis, in Ned J. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Methuen, London, 1980, pp. 120-­133.
  23. -­ Freeland 1987: Cynthia A. Freeland, Aristotle on Bodies, Matter, and Potentiality, in Alan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 392-­430.
  24. -­ Frey 2007: Christopher Frey, Organic Unity and the Matter of Man, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», 32 (2007), pp. 167-­204.
  25. -­ Furth 1987: Montgomery Furth, Aristotle’s Biological Universe: An Overview, in Alan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 21-­52.
  26. -­ Furth 1988: Montgomery Furth, Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelian Meta-­ physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
  27. -­ Giardina 2008: Giovanna R. Giardina, La chimica fisica di Aristotele: Teoria degli elementi e delle loro proprietà: Analisi critica del De generatione et corruptione, Aracne, Roma, 2008.
  28. -­ Gill 1989: Mary Louise Gill, Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity, Prince-­ ton University Press, Princeton, 1989.
  29. -­ Granger 1990: Herbert Granger, Aristotle and the Functionalist Debate, «Apeiron», 23 (1990) 1, pp. 27-­49.
  30. -­ Happ 1971: H. Heinz Happ, Hyle: Studien zum aristotelischen Materie-­Begriff, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1971.
  31. -­ Hare 1979: John E. Hare, Aristotle and the Definition of Natural Things, «Phrone-­ sis», 24 (1979), 2, pp. 168-­179.
  32. -­ Hartman 1977: Edwin Hartman, Substance, Body and Soul: Aristotelian Investiga-­ tions, Princeton University, Princeton, 1977.
  33. -­ Hesse 1965: Mary B. Hesse, Aristotle’s Logic of Analogy, «The Philosophical Quar-­ terly», 15 (1965) 61, pp. 328-­340.
  34. -­ Hesse 1966: Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1966.
  35. -­ Irwin 1988: Terence H. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.
  36. -­ Irwin 1991: Terence H. Irwin, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mind, in Stephen Everson (ed.), Companions to Ancient Thought: 2 Psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 56-­83.
  37. -­ Joachim 1903: Harold H. Joachim, Aristotle’s Conception of Chemical Combination, «Journal of Philology», 29 (1903), pp. 72-­86.
  38. -­ Jones 1974: Barrington Jones, Aristotle’s Introduction of Matter, «Philosophical Re-­ view», 83 (1974), pp. 474-­500.
  39. -­ Langton 2000: Rae Langton, The Musical, the Magical and the Mathematical Soul, in Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind Body Problem, Rout-­ ledge, London, 2000, pp. 13-­31.
  40. -­ Lewis 1966: David Lewis, An Argument for the Identity Thesis, «Journal of Philoso-­ phy», 63 (1966), pp. 17-­25.
  41. -­ Lewis 1972/1980: David Lewis, Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications (1972), in Ned J. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, Methuen, London, 1980, pp. 207-­215.
  42. -­ Lewis 1996: Eric Lewis (ed.), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle’s Meteorology 4, Duckworth, London, 1996.
  43. -­ Luyten 1963: Norbert M. Luyten, Matter as Potency, in E. McMullin (ed.), The Con-­ cept of Matter, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1963, pp. 122-­134.
  44. -­ Magee 2003: Joseph M. Magee, Unmixing the Intellect: Aristotle on Cognitive Pow-­ ers and Bodily Organs, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 2003.
  45. -­ Manning 1985: Rita Manning, Materialism, Dualism, and Functionalism in Aris-­ totle’s Philosophy of Mind, «Apeiron», 19 (1985) 1, pp. 11-­23.
  46. -­ McMullin 1963: Ernan McMullin, Matter as a Principle, in Id. (ed.), The Concept of Matter, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1963, pp. 169-­209.
  47. -­ Moreau 1962: Joseph Moreau, Aristote et son école, Presses universitaires de France, Paris,1962.
  48. -­ Nagel 1961/1968: Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, Harcourt-­Brace & World Inc., New York, 1961 (trad. it. La struttura della scienza: Problemi di logica nella spiegazione scientifica, a cura di C. Sborgi, Prefazione di A. Monti, Feltrinelli, Milano,1968).
  49. -­ Nelson 1990: John O. Nelson, Was Aristotle a Functionalist?, «Review of Meta-­ physics», 43 (1990) 4, pp. 791-­802.
  50. -­ Newell/Simon 1976: Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, Computer Science as Empiri-­ cal Inquiry: Symbols and Search, «Communications of the ACM», 19 (1976), pp. 113-­126.
  51. -­ Nussbaum 1978: Martha Craven Nussbaum (ed.). Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, Princeton University Press, Princeton,1978.
  52. -­ Nussbaum 1984: Martha Craven Nussbaum, Aristotelian Dualism: A Reply to Robin-­ son, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», 2 (1984), pp. 198-­207.
  53. -­ Nussbaum/Putnam 1992/1995: Martha Craven Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, Changing Aristotle’s Mind, in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty (eds.), Es-­ says on Aristotle’s De anima (1992), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 19952, pp. 27-­76.
  54. -­ Owens 1963: Joseph Owens, Matter and Predication in Aristotle, in Ernan McMullin (ed.), The Concept of Matter, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1963, pp. 99-­116.
  55. -­ Painter 2004: Corinne Painter, Aristotle and Functionalism: A Re-­Examination of Their «Natural» Disagreement, «Epoche», 9 (2004) 1, pp. 53-­77.
  56. -­ Peck 1942: Arthur L. Peck (ed.), Aristotle: Generation of Animals, Harvard Universi-­ ty Press, Cambridge (Mass.) -­London, 1942.
  57. -­ Peck 1961: Arthur L. Peck (ed.), Aristotle: Parts of Animals, Movement of Animals, Progression of Animals, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) -­ London, 1961.
  58. -­ Phlp. in de An.: Philoponus, In Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria, Edidit M. Hayduck, CAG XV, Reimer, Berlin, 1897.
  59. -­ Phlp. in GC: Philoponus, In Aristotelis libros De generatione et corruptione com-­ mentaria, Edidit H. Vitelli, CAG XIV 2, Reimer, Berlin, 1897.
  60. -­ Putnam 1967/1987: Hilary Putnam, The Nature of Mental States (1967), in Id. Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (trad. it. La natura de-­ gli stati mentali, in Mente, linguaggio e realtà, a cura di R. Cordeschi, Adelphi, Mila-­ no, 1987, pp. 461-­472).
  61. -­ Putnam 1973/1987: Hilary Putnam, Philosophy and Our Mental Life (1973), in Id. Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (trad. it. Filosofia e vita mentale, in Mente, linguaggio e realtà, a cura di R. Cordeschi, Adelphi, Mi-­ lano, 1987, pp. 318-­330).
  62. -­ Putnam H. 1974/1987: Hilary Putnam, Language and Reality (1974), in Id. Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (trad. it. Linguaggio e realtà, in Mente, linguaggio e realtà, a cura di R. Cordeschi, Milano: Adelphi, 1987, pp. 298-­317).
  63. -­ Putnam 1975/1987: Hilary Putnam, Introduction (1975), in Id. Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (trad. it. Introduzione, in Mente, lin-­ guaggio e realtà, a cura di R. Cordeschi, Adelphi, Milano, 1987, pp. 11-­21).
  64. -­ Putnam 1988: Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality, MIT press, 1988.
  65. -­ Rashed 2005: Marwan Rashed (éd.), Aristoteles: De la generation et la corruption, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2005.
  66. -­ Robinson 1978: Howard M. Robinson, Mind and Body in Aristotle, «Classical Quar-­ terly», 72 (1978), pp. 105-­124.
  67. -­ Rorty 1992/1995: Amélie O. Rorty, De Anima and Its Recent Interpreters, in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima (1992), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 19952, pp. 7-­14.
  68. -­ Ross 1936: William D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936.
  69. -­ Searle 1980: John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, «Behavioral and Brain Sci-­ ences», 3 (1980), pp. 417-­424.
  70. -­ Sellars 1963: Wilfrid Sellars, Abstract Entities, «Review of Metaphysics», 16 (1963), pp. 627-­671.
  71. -­ Shields 1990: Christopher Shields, The First Functionalist, in John C. Smith (ed.), The Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dor-­ drecht, 1990, pp. 19-­33.
  72. -­ Shields 1993: Christopher Shields, Some Recent Approaches to Aristotle’s De Anima, in David W. Hamlyn (ed.), Aristotle: De Anima Books II and III (With Certain Pas-­ sages From Book 1), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 157-­181.
  73. -­ Shields 1999: Christopher Shields, Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philoso-­ phy of Aristotle, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999.
  74. -­ Shields 2016: Christopher Shields (ed.), Aristotle: De Anima, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.
  75. -­ Shoemaker 1984: Sydney Shoemaker, Some Varieties of Functionalism, in Id. Identi-­ ty, Cause, and Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.
  76. -­ Simp. in de An.: Simplicius, In libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria, Edidit M. Hayduck, CAG XI, Reimer, Berlin, 1882.
  77. -­ Them. in de An.: Themistius, In libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis, Edidit R. Heinze, CAG V 3, Reimer, Berlin,1899.
  78. -­ Th. in de An.: Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, Cura ac studio A.M. Pirotta, Marietti, Torino, 1925.
  79. -­ Turing 1950: Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, «Mind», 59 (1950), pp. 433-­460.
  80. -­ Vegetti 1971: Mario Vegetti (a cura di), Aristotele: Le parti degli animali, in Diego Lanza e Mario Vegetti (a cura di), Opere biologiche di Aristotele, UTET, Torino, 1971, pp. 483-­736.
  81. -­ Wedin 1988: Michael V. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988.
  82. -­ Wedin 1993: Michael V. Wedin, Content and Cause in the Aristotelian Mind, «The Southern Journal of Philosophy», supp. 31 (1993), pp. 49-­105.
  83. -­ Wedin 1995/1996: Michael V. Wedin, Keeping the Matter in Mind: Aristotle on the Passion and the Soul (1995), in Frank A. Lewis and Robert Bolton (eds.), Form, Mat-­ ter, and Mixture in Aristotle, Blackwell, London, 1996, pp. 1-­38.
  84. -­ Wedin 1996: Michael V. Wedin, Aristotle on How to Define a Psychological State, «Topoi», 15 (1996), pp. 11-­24.
  85. -­ Whiting 1984: Jennifer E. Whiting, Individual Forms in Aristotle (PhD. Thesis), Cor-­ nell University Press, Ithaca (NY), 1984.
  86. -­ Whiting 1992/1995: Jennifer E. Whiting, Living Bodies, in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima (1992), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 19952, pp. 75-­92.
  87. -­ Wilkes 1978: Katherine V. Wilkes, Physicalism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978.
  88. -­ Williams 1986: Bernard Williams, Hylomorphism, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», 4 (1986), pp. 189-­199.
  89. -­ Zeller 1897: Eduard Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1897.

Giulia Mingucci, Il «Problema di Ackrill» e la «Tesi dei Due Corpi»: Per una critica all’interpretazione funzionalista della psicologia aristotelica in "RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA" 3/2023, pp 447-463, DOI: 10.3280/SF2023-003007