L’aumento dei requisiti di capitale minimo delle banche: alcune considerazioni

Titolo Rivista ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO
Autori/Curatori Giovanni B. Pittaluga
Anno di pubblicazione 2017 Fascicolo 2016/3
Lingua Italiano Numero pagine 14 P. 409-422 Dimensione file 453 KB
DOI 10.3280/ED2016-003004
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A seguito della crisi finanziaria del 2008-2009 con Basilea III sono stati introdotti requisiti di capitale minimo molto più severi che in precedenza. Ciò dovrebbe assicurare una più elevata stabilità dei sistemi bancari e finanziari dei paesi aderenti a questo accordo. Tuttavia, la Commissione Europea ha recepito Basilea III smussandone alcuni punti. Tale comportamento riflette, oltre che la struttura finanziaria banco-centrica dei paesi dell’Europa continentale, anche la particolare fase congiunturale di quest’area, in primis dell’Eurozona. In quest’ultima, in particolare, tende addirittura ad emergere una possibile contraddizione tra l’evoluzione della politica di vigilanza accentuatamente rigorosa e la politica monetaria decisamente espansiva.;

Keywords:Requisiti minimi di capitale, Basilea III, Modigliani-Miller, struttura finanziaria delle banche

Jel codes:G21, G28

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Giovanni B. Pittaluga, L’aumento dei requisiti di capitale minimo delle banche: alcune considerazioni in "ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO " 3/2016, pp 409-422, DOI: 10.3280/ED2016-003004