Journal title STUDI ECONOMICI
Author/s Massimo A. De Francesco, Neri Salvadori
Publishing Year 2010 Issue 2010/100
Language Italian Pages 25 P. 65-89 File size 1085 KB
DOI 10.3280/STE2010-100005
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In this work we are concerned with static price games played by a given number of capacity- constrained firms producing a homogeneous commodity. The focus is mainly on capacity configurations in which either all firms are equal or all are so except a larger one and such that no pure strategy equilibrium exists. We show that in the former case the symmetrical solution is the unique equilibrium whereas in the latter a number of asymmetrical equilibria may also exist.
Keywords: Symmetric and asymmetric oligopoly, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, mixed strategy equilibrium, symmetric equilibrium
Jel codes: C72, D43, L13
Massimo A. De Francesco, Neri Salvadori, Oligopoli simmetrici e oligoli asimmetrici in "STUDI ECONOMICI " 100/2010, pp 65-89, DOI: 10.3280/STE2010-100005