The Conventionalist Approach in the Analysis of Unemployment

Titolo Rivista HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY
Autori/Curatori Alessandro Morselli
Anno di pubblicazione 2025 Fascicolo 2024/2
Lingua Inglese Numero pagine 13 P. 149-161 Dimensione file 55 KB
DOI 10.3280/SPE2024-002009
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The purpose of this paper is to show the contribution of the conventionalist approach to the analysis of unemployment. The role of labor evaluations is highlighted. This approach leads to very different economic policy positions than those developed by neoclassical theory. Emphasis will be placed on microeconomic aspects, but in order to act in a macroeconomic context, i.e. that of conventions. In contrast to a Keynesian analysis oriented more on the quantitative problems of labor market disequilibrium, the effort here will be to show the importance of qualitative issues.

Keywords:unemployment analysis, coordination, quality conventions, evaluation operations, economic policy

Jel codes:B21, B22, B41, E13

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Alessandro Morselli, The Conventionalist Approach in the Analysis of Unemployment in "HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY" 2/2024, pp 149-161, DOI: 10.3280/SPE2024-002009