Can we have doubts on doubts?

Journal title EPISTEMOLOGIA
Author/s Giovanni Tuzet
Publishing Year 2015 Issue 2014/2
Language Italian Pages 7 P. 255-261 File size 32 KB
DOI 10.3280/EPIS2014-002005
DOI is like a bar code for intellectual property: to have more infomation click here

Below, you can see the article first page

If you want to buy this article in PDF format, you can do it, following the instructions to buy download credits

Article preview

FrancoAngeli is member of Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA), a not-for-profit association which run the CrossRef service enabling links to and from online scholarly content.

The paper argues that it is possible to have secondorder doubts, i.e. doubts on doubts, and claims that their function is to stimulate research in new directions, so as to overcome first-order doubts. This concerns both knowledge and belief, and, in particular, belief as a disposition to act. Doubt itself can be considered as partial belief (and a second-order doubt as a partial belief on a partial belief) when different reasons pull in opposite directions.

Keywords: Belief, doubt, knowledge, Peirce, Ramsey, reasons

  1. Agazzi E. (2007). Verità e conoscenza scientifica. In Amoretti M.C., Marsonet M. (eds.), Conoscenza e verità, Milano, Giuffrè, pp. 97-105.
  2. Agazzi E. (2008). Le rivoluzioni scientifiche e il mondo moderno, Milano, Fondazione Achille e Giulia Boroli.
  3. Barcan Marcus R. (1966). Iterated Deontic Modalities, Mind, 75(4), pp. 580-582.
  4. Bradley R. (2004). Ramsey’s Representation Theorem, Dialectica, 58(4), pp. 483-498.
  5. Calcaterra R.M. (2003). Pragmatismo: i valori dell’esperienza, Roma, Carocci.
  6. Engel P. (2005). Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme, Cognitio, 6(2), pp. 167-185.
  7. Engel P. (2007). Va savoir! De la connaissance en général, Paris, Hermann.
  8. Hintikka J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press.
  9. Huber F., Schmidt-Petri C. (eds.) (2009). Degrees of Belief, Dordrecht, Springer.
  10. Lewis C.S. (1990). Diario di un dolore, Milano, Adelphi (ed. or. 1961).
  11. Ramsey F.P. (1926). Truth and Probability. In Mellor D.H. (ed.) (1978), Foundations. Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, cap. 3.
  12. Rott H. (2001). Change, Choice and Inference. A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  13. Tiercelin C. (2005). Le doute en question, Paris / Tel Aviv, L’éclat.
  14. Tuzet G. (2009). Che successo ha la verità?, Paradigmi, 27(3), pp. 153-163.
  15. Williamson T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  16. Wittgenstein L. (1949-1951). Über Gewissheit, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1984 (trad. it. Della certezza, Torino, Einaudi, 1999).
  17. Zabell S.L. (1991). Ramsey, Truth, and Probability, Theoria, 57(3), pp. 211-238.

Giovanni Tuzet, Possiamo dubitare di dubitare? in "EPISTEMOLOGIA" 2/2014, pp 255-261, DOI: 10.3280/EPIS2014-002005