Saggio sull'indipendenza della banca centrale

In the recent years the argument for central bank independence gained momentum. Mainstream economic theory shows that the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank reduces the inflation bias of macroeconomic policy; empirical evidence is invoked to support this view. In this paper I stress that the theoretical benefit of central bank independence must be corrected for its potential costs: larger output variability, lack of co-ordination among monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, a larger democratic deficit. Moreover the empirical evidence supporting the case for central bank independence is not robust and is based on subjective and inaccurate indices of independence. Even if one accepted that the costs-benefits balance is positive and central bank independence is the lesser evil, there are several different "models of independence" and among these models that of the European Central Bank is far from being the best. JEL Classification: E58, E61 Università di Roma "La Sapienza", Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Dipartimento di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi per le Scelte Politiche (Articolo pervenuto nel marzo 2000);

Maurizio Michael Habib, Saggio sull'indipendenza della banca centrale in "STUDI ECONOMICI " 70/2000, pp , DOI: